Report
to Congress on the Situation in Iraq
General David H. Petraeus Commander,
Multi-National Force-Iraq
10-11 September 2007
Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, Members
of the Committees, thank you for the opportunity
to provide my assessment of the security situation
in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently
provided to my chain of command for the way forward.
At the outset, I would like to note that this is
my testimony.
Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations
to my chain of command, I wrote this testimony myself.
It has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone
in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress. As
a bottom line up front, the military objectives
of the surge are, in large measure, being met. In
recent months, in the face of tough enemies and
the brutal summer heat of Iraq, Coalition and Iraqi
Security Forces have achieved progress in the security
arena.
Though the improvements have been uneven across
Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in
Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with
the numbers of incidents in the last two weeks at
the lowest levels seen since June 2006. One reason
for the decline in incidents is that Coalition and
Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to Al
Qaeda-Iraq.
Though Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain
dangerous, we have taken away a number of their
sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas.
We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists,
capturing the head and numerous other leaders of
the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with
a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting
Iran’s activities in Iraq.
Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce
ethno-sectarian violence, as well, bringing down
the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially
in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the
sectarian violence last December. The number of
overall civilian deaths has also declined during
this period, although the numbers in each area are
still at troubling levels. Iraqi Security Forces
have also continued to grow and to shoulder more
of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns
about the sectarian tendencies of some elements
in their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements
have been standing and fighting and sustaining tough
losses, and they have taken the lead in operations
in many areas. Additionally, in what may be the
most significant development of the past 8 months,
the tribal rejection of Al Qaeda that started in
Anbar Province and helped produce such significant
change there has now spread to a number of other
locations as well.
Based on all this and on the further progress we
believe we can achieve over the next few months,
I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces
to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by
next summer without jeopardizing the security gains
that we have fought so hard to achieve.
Beyond that, while noting that the situation in
Iraq remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright
frustrating, I also believe that it is possible
to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though
doing so will be neither quick nor easy. Having
provided that summary, I would like to review the
nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation
before the surge, describe the current situation,
and explain the recommendations I have provided
to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq.
The Nature of the Conflict
The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is
competition among ethnic and sectarian communities
for power and resources. This competition will take
place, and its resolution is key to producing long-term
stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether
the competition takes place more – or less
– violently. This chart shows the security
challenges in Iraq. Foreign and home-grown terrorists,
insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all
push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence.
Malign actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran
fuel that violence.
Lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering
sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption
add to Iraq’s challenges.
The Situation in December 2006 and the Surge
In our recent efforts to look to the future, we
found it useful to revisit the past. In December
2006, during the height of the ethno-sectarian violence
that escalated in the wake of the bombing of the
Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders in Iraq
at that time – General George Casey and Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad – concluded that the coalition
was failing to achieve its objectives.
Their review underscored the need to protect the
population and reduce sectarian violence, especially
in Baghdad. As a result, General Casey requested
additional forces to enable the Coalition to accomplish
these tasks, and those forces began to flow in January.
In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi
counterparts have focused on improving security,
especially in Baghdad and the areas around it, wresting
sanctuaries from Al Qaeda control, and disrupting
the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists.
We have employed counterinsurgency practices that
underscore the importance of units living among
the people they are securing, and accordingly, our
forces have established dozens of joint security
stations and patrol bases manned by Coalition and
Iraqi forces in Baghdad and in other areas across
Iraq.
In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place,
we launched a series of offensive operations focused
on: expanding the gains achieved in the preceding
months in Anbar Province; clearing Baqubah, several
key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries
in Anbar Province, and important areas in the so-called
“belts” around Baghdad; and pursuing
Al Qaeda in the Diyala River Valley and several
other areas.
Throughout this period, as well, we engaged in dialogue
with insurgent groups and tribes, and this led to
additional elements standing up to oppose Al Qaeda
and other extremists. We also continued to emphasize
the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and
we employed non-kinetic means to exploit the opportunities
provided by the conduct of our kinetic operations
– aided in this effort by the arrival of additional
Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Current Situation and Trends
The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi
counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been
substantial. While there have been setbacks as well
as successes and tough losses along the way, overall,
our tactical commanders and I see improvements in
the security environment. We do not, however, just
rely on gut feel or personal observations; we also
conduct considerable data collection and analysis
to gauge progress and determine trends. We do this
by gathering and refining data from coalition and
Iraqi operations centers, using a methodology that
has been in place for well over a year and that
has benefited over the past seven months from the
increased presence of our forces living among the
Iraqi people.
We endeavor to ensure our analysis of that data
is conducted with rigor and consistency, as our
ability to achieve a nuanced understanding of the
security environment is dependent on collecting
and analyzing data in a consistent way over time.
Two US intelligence agencies recently reviewed our
methodology, and they concluded that the data we
produce is the most accurate and authoritative in
Iraq.
As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before
you reflects, the level of security incidents has
decreased significantly since the start of the surge
of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in
8 of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents
in the past two weeks the lowest since June 2006
and with the number of attacks this past week the
lowest since April 2006.
Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural
causes, have also declined considerably, by over
45% Iraq-wide since the height of the sectarian
violence in December. This is shown by the top line
on this chart, and the decline by some 70% in Baghdad
is shown by the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty
attacks by Al Qaeda have tragically added to the
numbers outside Baghdad, in particular. Even without
the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian
deaths is clearly still too high and continues to
be of serious concern.
As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian
deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian
casualty figures, has also declined significantly
since the height of the sectarian violence in December.
Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart,
the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down
by over 55%, and it would have come down much further
were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric
Al Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite sectarian
violence.
In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number
of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by some
80% since December. This chart also displays the
density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad
neighborhoods and it both reflects the progress
made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the
Iraqi capital and identifies the areas that remain
the most challenging. As we have gone on the offensive
in former Al Qaeda and insurgent sanctuaries, and
as locals have increasingly supported our efforts,
we have found a substantially increased number of
arms, ammunition, and explosives caches.
As this chart shows, we have, so far this year,
already found and cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly
1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year.
This may be a factor in the reduction in the number
of overall improvised explosive device attacks in
recent months, which as this chart shows, has declined
sharply, by about one-third, since June.
The change in the security situation in Anbar Province
has, of course, been particularly dramatic. As this
chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have
declined from some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit
over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease
reflects the significance of the local rejection
of Al Qaeda and the newfound willingness of local
Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi Army
and Iraqi Police Service. As I noted earlier, we
are seeing similar actions in other locations, as
well. To be sure, trends have not been uniformly
positive across Iraq, as is shown by this chart
depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces.
The trend in Ninevah Province, for example, has
been much more up and down, until a recent decline,
and the same is true in Sala ad Din Province, though
recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in
the right direction. In any event, the overall trajectory
in Iraq – a steady decline of incidents in
the past three months – is still quite significant.
The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has
also declined in each of the past 5 months, from
a high of some 175 in March, as this chart shows,
to about 90 this past month. While this trend in
recent months has been heartening, the number of
high profile attacks is still too high, and we continue
to work hard to destroy the networks that carry
out these barbaric attacks. Our operations have,
in fact, produced substantial progress against Al
Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq.
As this chart shows, in the past 8 months, we have
considerably reduced the areas in which Al Qaeda
enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 media
cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al Qaeda-Iraq,
and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders
and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda
is certainly not defeated; however, it is off balance
and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively.
Of note, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate
on Iraq explained, these gains against Al Qaeda
are a result of the synergy of actions by: conventional
forces to deny the terrorists sanctuary; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to find
the enemy; and special operations elements to conduct
targeted raids.
A combination of these assets is necessary to prevent
the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq.
In the past six months we have also targeted Shia
militia extremists, capturing a number of senior
leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander
of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, the organization
created to support the training, arming, funding,
and, in some cases, direction of the militia extremists
by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps’ Qods
Force.
These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi
governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers
with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran,
and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International
Zone and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent
to both Coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through
the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi
Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve
its interests and fight a proxy war against the
Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.
The most significant development in the past six
months likely has been the increasing emergence
of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaeda
and other extremists. This has, of course, been
most visible in Anbar Province. A year ago the province
was assessed as “lost” politically.
Today, it is a model of what happens when local
leaders and citizens decide to oppose Al Qaeda and
reject its Taliban-like ideology. While Anbar is
unique and the model it provides cannot be replicated
everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic
change in security that is possible with the support
and participation of local citizens.
As this chart shows, other tribes have been inspired
by the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered
to fight extremists as well. We have, in coordination
with the Iraqi government’s National Reconciliation
Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups
of local citizens who want to oppose extremists
and to contribute to local security. Some 20,000
such individuals are already being hired for the
Iraqi Police, thousands of others are being assimilated
into the Iraqi Army, and thousands more are vying
for a spot in Iraq’s Security Forces. Iraqi
Security Forces As I noted earlier, Iraqi Security
Forces have continued to grow, to develop their
capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden
of providing security for their country. Despite
concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics
and supporting institutions, and an insufficient
number of qualified commissioned and non-commissioned
officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country.
As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi
Army, National Police, and Special Operations Forces
Battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those
capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit
with some coalition support. Beyond that, all of
Iraq’s battalions have been heavily involved
in combat operations that often result in the loss
of leaders, soldiers, and equipment.
These losses are among the shortcomings identified
by operational readiness assessments, but we should
not take from these assessments the impression that
Iraqi forces are not in the fight and contributing.
Indeed, despite their shortages, many Iraqi units
across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance.
As counterinsurgency operations require substantial
numbers of boots on the ground, we are helping the
Iraqis expand the size of their security forces.
Currently, there are some 445,000 individuals on
the payrolls of Iraq’s Interior and Defense
Ministries.
Based on recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki,
the number of Iraq’s security forces will
grow further by the end of this year, possibly by
as much as 40,000. Given the security challenges
Iraq faces, we support this decision, and we will
work with the two security ministries as they continue
their efforts to expand their basic training capacity,
leader development programs, logistical structures
and elements, and various other institutional capabilities
to support the substantial growth in Iraqi forces.
Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend
more on its security forces than it will receive
in security assistance from the United States.
In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States’
larger foreign military sales customers, committing
some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with the possibility
of up to $1.8 billion more being committed before
the end of this year. And I appreciate the attention
that some members of Congress have recently given
to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. To summarize,
the security situation in Iraq is improving, and
Iraqis elements are slowly taking on more of the
responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable
challenges lie ahead; however, Coalition and Iraqi
Security Forces have made progress toward achieving
sustainable security.
As a result, the United States will be in a position
to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.
Recommendations Two weeks ago I provided recommendations
for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain
of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence
of the approach I recommended is captured in its
title: “Security While Transitioning: From
Leading to Partnering to Overwatch.” This
approach seeks to build on the security improvements
our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought
so hard to achieve in recent months.
It reflects recognition of the importance of securing
the population and the imperative of transitioning
responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi
forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing
to failure. It includes substantial support for
the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces.
It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency
strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis
gradually shouldering more of the load. And it highlights
the importance of regional and global diplomatic
approaches. Finally, in recognition of the fact
that this war is not only being fought on the ground
in Iraq but also in cyberspace, it also notes the
need to contest the enemy’s growing use of
that important medium to spread extremism. The recommendations
I provided were informed by operational and strategic
considerations.
The operational considerations include recognition
that:
• military aspects of the surge have achieved
progress and generated momentum;
• Iraqi Security Forces have continued to
grow and have slowly been shouldering more of the
security burden in Iraq;
• a mission focus on either population security
or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve
our objectives;
• success against Al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-supported
militia extremists requires conventional forces
as well as special operations forces; and
• the security and local political situations
will enable us to draw down the surge forces. My
recommendations also took into account a number
of strategic considerations:
• political progress will take place only
if sufficient security exists;
• long-term US ground force viability will
benefit from force reductions as the surge runs
its course;
• regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives
are critical to success; and
• Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume
greater sovereignty in their country, although,
as they recently announced, they do desire continued
presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under
a new UN Security Council Resolution and, following
that, they want to negotiate a long term security
agreement with the United States and other nations.
Based on these considerations, and having worked
the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General
Ray Odierno to ensure that we retain and build on
the gains for which our troopers have fought, I
have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces
from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine
Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge
will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations
are approved, that unit’s departure will be
followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team
without replacement in mid-December and the further
redeployment without replacement of four other brigade
combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions
in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the
pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July
2008.
I would also like to discuss the period beyond next
summer. Force reductions will continue beyond the
pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we
will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my professional
judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations
on the pace of such reductions at this time. In
fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown
that projecting too far into the future is not just
difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous.
The events of the past six months underscore that
point. When I testified in January, for example,
no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province
would have been transformed the way it has in the
past 6 months. Nor would anyone have predicted that
volunteers in one-time Al Qaeda strongholds like
Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern
Baghdad would seek to join the fight against Al
Qaeda.
Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led government
would accept significant numbers of Sunni volunteers
into the ranks of the local police force in Abu
Ghraib. Beyond that, on a less encouraging note,
none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent
of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about
which we and Iraq’s leaders all now have greater
concern. In view of this, I do not believe it is
reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for
the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments
beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March
of next year. We will, no later than that time,
consider factors similar to those on which I based
the current recommendations, having by then, of
course, a better feel for the security situation,
the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi
counterparts, and the enemy situation.
I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations
I have explained here today, also take into consideration
the demands on our Nation’s ground forces,
although I believe that that consideration should
once again inform, not drive, the recommendations
I make. This chart captures the recommendations
I have described, showing the recommended reduction
of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course
and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting
their missions and transitioning responsibilities
to Iraqis, as the situation and Iraqi capabilities
permit.
It also reflects the no-later-than date for recommendations
on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides
a possible approach we have considered for the future
force structure and mission set in Iraq. One may
argue that the best way to speed the process in
Iraq is to change the MNF-I mission from one that
emphasizes population security, counter-terrorism,
and transition, to one that is strictly focused
on transition and counter-terrorism. Making that
change now would, in our view, be premature.
We have learned before that there is a real danger
in handing over tasks to the Iraqi Security Forces
before their capacity and local conditions warrant.
In fact, the drafters of the recently released National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq recognized this danger
when they wrote, and I quote, “We assess that
changing the mission of Coalition forces from a
primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role
to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces
and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from
establishing a safe haven would erode security gains
achieved thus far.”
In describing the recommendations I have made, I
should note again that, like Ambassador Crocker,
I believe Iraq’s problems will require a long-term
effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions.
And though we both believe this effort can succeed,
it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in
fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature
drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating
consequences. That assessment is supported by the
findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency
report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal
of US forces from Iraq.
Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes
that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further
release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq
and produce a number of dangerous results, including
a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi Security
Forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives;
Al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom
of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further
ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows;
alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal
and external forces to gain advantages over their
rivals; and exacerbation of already challenging
regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.
Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment
and believe that the best way to secure our national
interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq
is to continue to focus our operations on securing
the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups
and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions
are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.
Closing Comments
Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues
for your support of our men and women in uniform
in Iraq. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines,
and Coast Guardsmen with whom I’m honored
to serve are the best equipped and, very likely,
the most professional force in our nation’s
history. Impressively, despite all that has been
asked of them in recent years, they continue to
raise their right hands and volunteer to stay in
uniform.
With three weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact,
the Army elements in Iraq, for example, have achieved
well over 130% of the reenlistment goals in the
initial term and careerist categories and nearly
115% in the mid-career category. All of us appreciate
what you have done to ensure that these great troopers
have had what they’ve needed to accomplish
their mission, just as we appreciate what you have
done to take care of their families, as they, too,
have made significant sacrifices in recent years.
The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems
and individual equipment; in munitions; in command,
control, and communications systems; in intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; in
vehicles and counter-IED systems and programs; and
in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable
in Iraq.
The capabilities that you have funded most recently
– especially the vehicles that will provide
greater protection against improvised explosive
devices – are also of enormous importance.
Additionally, your funding of the Commander’s
Emergency Response Program has given our leaders
a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency
campaign.
Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our
new detention programs and rule of law initiatives
in Iraq. In closing, it remains an enormous privilege
to soldier again in Iraq with America’s new
“Greatest Generation.” Our country’s
men and women in uniform have done a magnificent
job in the most complex and challenging environment
imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of
their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today.
Thank you very much.
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